The Man Who Broke the Bank of England
An Inside Look into George Soros’s Questionable Ethics, Philosophical Guidelines, and the Art of Profiting from Instability
The tearoom on Chancery Lane was a haven of quiet opulence, its walls lined with damask and its tables adorned with crisp linen, where the soft clatter of teaspoons against bone china composed a subtle overture. On an autumn afternoon in 1956, George Soros sat opposite Robert Mayer, the air between them thick with the scent of bergamot and unspoken possibility.
Soros, his lean frame taut with resolve, pushed a lock of dark hair from his forehead and spoke in a hushed, deliberate tone. “I’m finished here,” he said, his words carrying the weight of a decision long wrestled. “The firm—it’s not where I belong anymore.”
Mayer, whose calm demeanor masked a keen opportunist’s mind, set his teacup down with the precision of a man accustomed to calculated risks. His eyes, sharp and appraising, met Soros’s. “Funny you should say that, George,” he replied. “My father’s got a small brokerage in New York, and he’s on the hunt for someone with your kind of fire. I’ve thought about mentioning it before, but it felt… indelicate, trying to steal you away.” He paused, letting the words settle like dust after a storm. “Now, though, it seems the stars have aligned.”
Soros leaned back, his fingers tracing the rim of his cup as his mind churned. New York—the city where dreams were minted and fortunes spun on the edge of a dime. “Tell me about it,” he said, his voice steady, a spark of hunger flickering in his gaze. “Tell me everything.”
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At a crucial juncture in George Soros’s life, Robert Mayer emerged as a harbinger of opportunity. Now, with Soros’s plans laid bare, the circumstances had shifted dramatically. Soros, though unable to sever ties instantaneously, acted with alacrity. This serendipitous offer would propel him into the crucible of American finance, positioning him at the very epicenter of opportunity.
Yet, the path was not without obstacles. The authorities, skeptical of Soros’s indispensability, denied him a visa, citing his youth—at 26, he was deemed neither uniquely qualified nor irreplaceable by American talent. Nevertheless, through a stroke of fortune and nascent connections with F. M. Mayer’s enterprise, the impasse was overcome. In September 1956, George Soros set foot on American soil, a moment that marked the inception of his ascent.
For the next three years, until 1959, Soros toiled under Mayer’s aegis, trading stocks with a focus that belied his limited scope of action. By his own admission, he was no investor then—merely a trader, navigating the markets with constrained autonomy. Yet, his efficiency was undeniable. Soros devised a strategy that would become a hallmark of his career: he gravitated toward nascent, underexplored sectors, a pursuit that demanded both intuition and audacity. This approach, while risky, granted him a near-monopolistic edge. In uncharted territories, scant knowledge sufficed to excel, allowing him to outmaneuver competitors. As these fields matured and specialists emerged, Soros, with prescience, withdrew, ceding the stage to others. He styled himself a “pre-expert,” a pioneer who thrived on the cusp of discovery.
In candid reflections, Soros has acknowledged a certain indolence, a propensity to exert only the effort required. He has mused, with disarming self-criticism, that in his most prosperous years, he labored least, only to redouble his efforts when fortunes waned. Even during his earlier tenure at Singer & Friedlander, he was not renowned for meticulousness or rigor. Yet, when he ventured into a new domain, his approach transformed. A selective perfectionist, Soros immersed himself deeply in what mattered, while matters he deemed peripheral fell by the wayside. This disciplined pragmatism, as history attests, served him extraordinarily well.
At F. M. Mayer, Soros honed his expertise in European equities, a niche that captivated American banks and institutional investors. The post-war European landscape, vibrant with possibility, was fertile ground for speculation. The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community signaled the march toward the Common Market, and whispers of a united Europe—a veritable United States of Europe—stirred the ambitions of financiers. Soros, attuned to these currents, positioned himself as a conduit between continents, capitalizing on the burgeoning interest in Europe’s economic renaissance.
This era also bore witness to the clandestine gatherings of the Bilderberg Group, first convened in 1954 at its eponymous Dutch hotel. Shrouded in secrecy, these meetings yielded little to public scrutiny, with terse, guarded statements their only yield. Officially, the group disavowed any influence over political machinations, yet decades of evidence suggest otherwise.
From its inception, the Bilderberg conferences deliberated the unification of Europe and the advent of the euro, setting the stage for seismic shifts in global finance. In this crucible of ideas, Soros found himself navigating a world where foresight and discretion were paramount, his early forays laying the groundwork for a career that would redefine the boundaries of financial influence.
George Soros had by then parted ways with E.M. Mayer and joined the ranks of Wertheim & Co. Reflecting on the landscape of European enterprises, he paints a picture of an era shrouded in informational scarcity. As a trader and analyst of European securities, Soros describes himself as a one-eyed man among the blind, navigating a terrain where the paucity of concrete data compelled him to craft speculative memoranda. Yet, this very limitation became his advantage, positioning him leagues ahead of his peers. He had unearthed a niche in the market and wielded it with finesse, earning the attention and counsel of the industry’s titans.
With a quiet pride, Soros recalls this period as his first significant triumph. He stood at the epicenter of the financial world, with even the colossi of the industry—J.P. Morgan among them—hanging on his every word. They sought the rare insights into European markets that only he could provide, for no one else in the United States had ventured so deeply into this uncharted domain. His was a pioneering endeavor, bold and singular.
At Wertheim & Co., Soros immersed himself in the study of German banks and insurance firms, presenting his analyses to J.P. Morgan. Though time constraints precluded a more exhaustive study, his insights sufficed to convince the firm of an imminent surge in European stock values. Entrusted with the mandate to invest, Soros acted decisively, and the markets responded with a resounding boom. Yet, this triumph was short-lived.
The introduction of a 15 percent surcharge on foreign investments, enacted through President John F. Kennedy’s Interest Equalization Tax, struck a devastating blow to Soros’s burgeoning enterprise. Almost overnight, the edifice of his European dealings crumbled. Though a handful of profitable transactions lingered, Soros was compelled to chart a new course, his vision undimmed but his path irrevocably altered.
The Failed Philosopher
To trace every milestone in the storied career of George Soros would be a Sisyphean task, yet certain pivotal moments demand illumination—moments that forged the path to his vast fortune, a wealth that, intertwined with his singular temperament, has granted him extraordinary latitude in the realm of sociopolitical influence.
The reverberations of this influence ripple through our present in ways scarcely anticipated. Soros does not always stand in the spotlight, nor can his involvement always be definitively proven, let alone tied to deleterious global consequences. Yet the evidence, at times starkly compelling, speaks for itself.
A growing chorus of informed voices now warns of the profound and often troubling impact of Soros’s activities, as disparate threads of information weave into a coherent, disquieting tapestry. Soon, the focus will shift to these very matters—to historical currents, clandestine networks, orchestrated crises, and the subtle choreography of global events that have shaped the 20th and 21st centuries.
At the heart of this narrative lies Soros’s philosophy, deeply influenced by the theories of Karl Popper, whose ideas he fleetingly invoked. A lifelong admirer of Popper, Soros has never relinquished his aspiration to be regarded as a philosopher capable of effecting change. His doctorate, earned in 1954 at the London School of Economics, stands as a testament to this enduring ambition.
As for his financial odyssey, the details that emerge are nothing short of revelatory, shedding light on the evolving cast of characters who crossed his path, the methodologies that underpinned his empire, and the deliberations that shaped his ascent.
Yet the central question is not how Soros amassed his wealth, but what he has chosen to do with it—the initiatives he has championed, the vast sums he has deployed as a philanthropist to reshape the world in his image. His endeavors, as we shall see, touch the very essence of our collective existence.
For those captivated by the mechanics of Soros’s rise from humble origins to billionaire status, eager to decipher and perhaps emulate his strategies, this account may prove unsatisfying. Such readers would be better served by consulting the writings of the financial oracle himself. The paragraphs and articles that follow will instead foreground sociopolitical and geostrategic dimensions, probing the future of Europe—and by extension, Germany—without delving exhaustively into the minutiae of Soros’s wealth-building or offering a blueprint for replicating his success. Still, no portrait of Soros would be complete without a nod to the extraordinary arc of his achievements.
During his tenure at Wertheim & Co., Soros remained a considerable distance from his first million, with billions a distant dream. He envisioned a five-year stint, sufficient to amass $500,000, after which he planned to return to England and pursue philosophical studies. In reality, he lingered until 1963, immersing himself not only in finance but also in philosophical inquiry. During this period, he penned an essay titled The Burden of Consciousness, printing it at the firm’s expense and sending a copy to Popper, who responded with encouragement. This prompted Soros to visit his former mentor, a decade after completing his studies.
It was in this crucible of thought that the Hungarian émigré, now adrift in America, forged his theory of reflexivity. Born of personal experience, this theory grappled, in broad strokes, with the interplay between thought and reality. Soros posited that our understanding of the world is inherently imperfect, as we are ourselves embedded within the very systems we seek to comprehend. Through this lens, he sought to illuminate how individual perceptions and biases could sway market dynamics, potentially upending established economic principles.
His attempt to place thought and reality in a dialectical relationship gave rise to the principle of reflexivity, though the endeavor was fraught with challenges—not least the difficulty of articulating something novel on a timeworn subject and the struggle to define reflexivity itself. Often, what he wrote one day seemed incoherent by the next, a maddening cycle of clarity and confusion.
Though Soros took his philosophical pursuits seriously, he harbored doubts about their reception. In a chapter titled “Autobiography of a Failed Philosopher,” he recounts his son Robert’s childhood observation: “My father sits down and spins theories to explain why he does this or that. But I remember thinking as a kid, dear God, at least half of it is nonsense.” Yet to grasp markets as Soros did required a profound understanding of the world itself—especially for one intent on shaping it. He later noted that his theory of reflexivity could explain the efficacy of the propaganda techniques depicted in Orwell’s 1984, particularly in the context of post-9/11 American politics under George W. Bush, whom he fiercely opposed.
In the 1960s, such concerns were far from his mind. The “failed philosopher” toiled between 1963 and 1966, revising his doctoral dissertation while working, with waning enthusiasm, at Arnhold and S. Bleichroeder, where he had risen to vice president. Increasingly, he felt himself spinning in intellectual circles, trapped in a fruitless loop. Resolving to break free, Soros drew a line under his philosophical musings and turned his focus back to the world of commerce, where his true genius awaited.
Soros Fund Management
Arnhold and S. Bleichroeder, the firm where George Soros honed his craft from 1963 to 1973, was a fusion of two venerable German institutions. The first, founded in 1864 by brothers Max and Georg Arnhold in Dresden, had grown by the Roaring Twenties into a titan among private German banks, employing over 500 souls. The second, Samuel Bleichroeder’s Berlin-based bank, traced its lineage to 1803 and was entwined with the Rothschild dynasty, serving as their Berlin outpost. This connection introduced the Rothschild name into Soros’s orbit—a name synonymous with financial might. In the shadow of the Second World War, Bleichroeder’s bank was “Aryanized” in 1935, only to be uprooted two years later and replanted in New York. By 1939, the merged entity bore the name Arnhold and S. Bleichroeder.
It was here that Soros crossed paths with James Beeland Rogers, known as Jim Rogers, a daring investor whose appetite for risk bordered on the audacious. Rogers was a man who thrived on the precipice, whether amassing shares in teetering corporations or embarking on a quixotic motorcycle odyssey through the Soviet Union and China at the height of the Cold War. He became the first cornerstone of Soros’s carefully curated team, though many others in that circle remain cloaked in anonymity.
In 1969, with a modest $4 million, the duo set their venture in motion. Soros, still tethered to Arnhold and S. Bleichroeder, took the leap to independence in 1973, founding Soros Fund Management alongside Rogers. Yet it was Soros’s name that blazed in the firmament, while Rogers’s flickered in the margins.
Much of this enterprise remains veiled in shadow. Soros Fund Management, it is said, served as an advisory arm for the Quantum Group of Funds, with the famed Quantum Fund as Soros’s inaugural hedge fund. In truth, the distinction was largely semantic.
When pressed on the Quantum Fund’s origins in 1973, Soros remarked with disarming candor, “Yes, but back then it was called the Soros Fund.” The identities of the fund’s backers were never disclosed, yet its establishment hinged on the largesse of affluent, evidently sympathetic investors. By 1969, the Rothschilds, alongside other prominent European families, had poured $6 million into Soros’s coffers—a silent vote of confidence in his vision.
The Quantum Fund’s chosen domiciles— Curaçao in the Netherlands Antilles and the Cayman Islands—set off alarm bells. These Caribbean havens, notorious as offshore sanctuaries, are indelibly linked to tax evasion, money laundering, shell companies, and bespoke financial “services.”
In a 1994 interview published as a book, Krisztina Koenen probed Soros on why he had anchored his storied Quantum Fund not in the United States but in the Caribbean, pointedly asking, “Is there something you might wish to conceal from U.S. authorities, perhaps the tax authorities?” Soros’s response was measured yet evasive: “In 1973, when the Quantum Investment Fund was founded, there were distinct advantages to operating outside U.S. territory, both in terms of taxes and regulatory frameworks. The fund was intended for non-American investors, so the location better suited its purpose. Most of those advantages have since vanished, but for historical reasons, we stayed.” His words, draped in the guise of tradition, rang hollow to skeptical ears.
To be fair, the Cayman Islands, a British Overseas Territory, host a lion’s share of hedge funds—69 percent, according to the British Financial Conduct Authority’s 2014 Hedge Fund Survey, compared to a mere 10 percent in the U.S. Even law enforcement agencies, tasked with unraveling international money laundering tied to offshore centers, caution against branding these locales as underworld bazaars. “It would be inaccurate to view offshore centers as black markets,” notes a German criminal police report, “as they constitute a significant and legitimate segment of the global financial system.”
Daily, some $3 trillion in transactions flow through these hubs, their numbers swelling from 55 in 1945 to roughly 175 today. The report underscores that offshore financial maneuvers, when compliant with legal standards, are neither illicit nor reprehensible but merely cost-effective, akin to relocating manufacturing to lower-cost nations. The distinction, it emphasizes, lies between reputable and unscrupulous actors.
A Web of Questionable Associates
According to F. William Engdahl, a German-American political scientist and incisive commentator, George Soros secured the allegiance of 99 “sophisticated investors,” as mandated by U.S. law for a fund of such ambition. Engdahl distills the matter with piercing clarity: “All were non-Americans, ensuring that U.S. tax authorities were barred from scrutinizing his books—a practice hardly consonant with the ideals of an ‘open society.’” Nor was transparency the hallmark of Soros’s dealings with an elite coterie of affluent families, orbiting the gravitational pull of the Rothschild dynasty.
The founding of the Quantum Fund, now known as the Quantum Endowment Fund, forged a decades-long bond with the Rothschilds, one that Engdahl views not as a mere banking arrangement but as a conduit to privileged channels of information—both governmental and private. This access, he argues, accounts for Soros’s meteoric success in the treacherous waters of high-risk finance far more than any gambler’s luck.
The Quantum Fund’s roster glitters with illustrious names, each thread in its tapestry revealing intricate ties, particularly to the Rothschild banking empire. Among them was Baron Nils Otto von Taube, an Estonian aristocrat who served as an advisor and senior investment manager to Lord Jacob Rothschild.
It was Taube who, in the 1970s, ushered Soros into the gold market and later played an important role in establishing the Soros Open Estonia Foundation, one of the myriad Open Society Foundations whose influence will soon demand closer scrutiny. Soros, recognizing Taube’s acumen, invited him to join the Quantum Fund’s advisory council.
Then there was Richard Katz, an Englishman whose career spanned decades in global banking. Katz served N.M. Rothschild & Sons in London from 1977 to 1993 and Rothschild Italia S.p.A. in Milan from its inception in 1989 until 1992. In 1986, he joined the Quantum Fund’s executive committee as a director, later assuming a seat on the board of Geneva’s Union Bancaire Privée (UBP) in 2009, described as a “well-connected banker.” UBP’s records list Katz as a director of the Quantum Endowment Fund, LHC Investments, and Asian Capital Holdings Fund.
In 1994, Katz felt compelled to pen an open letter to The Independent, which had published repeated exposés on Soros and the Quantum Fund. Decrying what he deemed biased reporting, Katz’s missive reads as a defense of the fund’s practices, concluding with a curt vow: “We will not further respond to your prejudiced coverage.”
The entanglement between UBP and Quantum runs deeper still. Edgar de Picciotto, UBP’s billionaire founder and chairman, sits on a Quantum committee and shares a close confidant’s bond with Soros. Born in 1929 in Beirut, de Picciotto fled with his family to Switzerland in the 1950s, escaping an anti-Semitic climate. The parallels between the two men—near contemporaries, shaped by displacement and ambition—are striking.
In a 2015 dispatch for Zurich’s Inside Paradeplatz, financial journalist Lukas Hässig lauded de Picciotto’s singular ascent: “In his 85 years, de Picciotto has built his fabled wealth and attendant power entirely on his own. Today, he ranks among the planet’s most influential financiers.” The words echo with a familiarity, as if tracing the contours of Soros’s own legend.
Within this constellation of “right” individuals, an almost unfathomable potential converges. UBP, too, reflects the nepotism that often attends such circles, with de Picciotto’s son Daniel and daughter Anne Rotman de Picciotto seated on its board—a dynastic echo of wealth’s enduring grip.
The constellation of players in George Soros’s orbit extends to figures like Alberto Foglia of Lugano’s Banca del Ceresio, a bank intertwined with Soros since its earliest days, and Beat Notz of Geneva’s Notz Stucki Asset Managers. In his incisive analysis, Lukas Hässig lays bare the machinery at work: “Four figures, bound to Edgar de Picciotto’s network, sit within Soros’s Quantum empire. This grants privileged knowledge, which de Picciotto deftly leverages for himself and his Geneva private bank.”
Hässig paints de Picciotto as a colossus, a Lebanese-born financier of Jewish descent who pulls the strings of global finance with a maestro’s precision. “This is no game for the faint-hearted, content to linger on a pony farm,” he writes. “Around de Picciotto and his UBP, explosions—some minor, others seismic—have repeatedly detonated.”
One such detonation erupted on November 27, 1994, when U.S. federal agents struck, arresting Jean-Jacques Handali, a senior UBP representative, alongside Gary Kaminsky, then of Dollar Time, Inc., who would later rise to vice chairman at Morgan Stanley in 2013.
Kaminsky, the financial chief of a retail chain, had been under scrutiny since 1993. The charge: money laundering tied to the drug trade. In a covert sting, authorities infiltrated the network with an informant who dangled $3 million for laundering. Yet the true target was the “Swiss connection,” embodied by Handali, a key figure at UBP. The bank swiftly disavowed knowledge of the scheme, insisting Handali acted alone.
Reports, however, implicated two additional UBP managers—Jeckile E. Valero and Karl Michael Ley—who funneled millions in drug money through the bank’s channels. Consequently, $15 million on a UBP account was frozen, suspected of being laundered proceeds. The Handali affair, later parodied in the film The Wolf of Wall Street, underscores the audacity of such schemes, though the sums involved pale beside UBP’s $130 billion in managed assets. De Picciotto, undeterred by the scandal, remained steadfast.
The 2008 Madoff scandal, a fraud of unprecedented scale, dealt a heavier blow. Bernard L. Madoff, former NASDAQ chairman, had swindled investors of billions over decades through a Ponzi scheme. UBP, heavily exposed with $700 million invested in Madoff’s funds, reeled as de Picciotto’s children and nephews faced financial ruin.
The 80-year-old “doyen of Geneva’s banking scene” returned to the fray, striving to salvage his empire. In a bid for damage control, he pledged to reimburse clients 50 percent of their losses, provided they remained loyal to UBP for five years. The bank, an early adopter of hedge funds, had engaged Madoff without suspecting his deceit. The scandal’s toll was grimly personal: two years after Madoff’s arrest, his son Mark, aged 46, took his life, hanging himself with a black dog leash, a tragedy widely linked to his father’s infamy. Thus, the titans of wealth and power, in their relentless pursuit, cast long shadows, engulfing not only countless strangers but, at times, their own kin.
Mystery shrouds other episodes, none more haunting than the fate of Edmond Jacob Safra, a lifelong friend of de Picciotto. A Lebanese-born billionaire and banker, Safra founded the Republic National Bank of New York in 1966, steering it to dazzling heights.
In 1999, he perished in a blaze under enigmatic circumstances in his Monaco penthouse. Safra, lauded as a philanthropist and adorned with honors, was later implicated in U.S. investigations that exposed his bank as a conduit for billions funneled from New York to Moscow, directly into the maw of organized crime.
Intriguingly, Safra’s Geneva-based Trade Development Bank (TDB), established in 1956, merged in 1990 with de Picciotto’s Compagnie de Banque et d’Investissements (CBI), founded in 1969, to form the CBI-TDB Union Bancaire Privée.
A Wager Worth a Pound
How did George Soros’s saga of triumph unfold from those nascent days in America? As a young émigré, he had charted a modest course: amass $500,000 in five years, return to England, and immerse himself in philosophy. Reflecting on this ambition in a conversation with Gregor Peter Schmitz, Soros described it as “my personal five-year plan,” only to admit, with a wry smile, “Unfortunately, it went awry. I earned far more than expected in those first five years.” Schmitz, catching the irony, interjected, “How inconvenient…” Yet Soros stood by his claim of failure, at least in one sense: the dream of England and philosophical pursuits remained unfulfilled. Regardless, the groundwork for a vertiginous ascent—akin to scaling the Matterhorn’s north face—was firmly laid.
The establishment of the Quantum Fund in the Caribbean betrayed Soros’s indifference to transparency. Anchored in Curaçao and the Cayman Islands, the fund operated beyond the reach of U.S. financial regulators, its investors a select cadre of Europeans. This elite circle reaped the fund’s prodigious profits, which were nothing short of staggering.
Soros himself revealed a remarkable detail: among these investors was Queen Elizabeth II, sovereign not only of the United Kingdom but of 14 other realms, including Australia, Canada, and the very offshore havens like the Cayman Islands that, as British Overseas Territories, fall under the Crown’s aegis.
Thomas Schmitt, writing for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, captured Soros’s legacy with precision: “Soros made hedge funds respectable. These funds, with their innocuous name, now symbolize towering returns, though few understand precisely how they achieve them.”
By 1980, the Quantum Fund managed nearly $100 million, a sum that strained Soros and his partner, Jim Rogers, to their limits. The workload had grown unmanageable, and while Rogers clung to their original, hands-on approach, Soros sought fresh talent to bolster the operation.
Tensions arose as Rogers balked at the new hires, a discord that fractured their partnership. By the end, Soros found himself steering the enterprise alone, both captain and crew, with only one or two assistants. The fund’s profits soared—doubling its capital in two years, a feat unmatched by any investment vehicle of its time. Yet the relentless pressure took its toll. Soros faced a choice: the fund or himself. “The workload had become unbearable,” he later confessed. Opting for self-preservation, he weathered 1981 as the fund’s sole loss-making year. A third of its investors withdrew, the fund’s shares shed a fifth of their value, and its overall worth plummeted by half. Soros stepped back from active management, appointing new stewards whose efforts yielded only middling results, rendering 1983 and 1984 lackluster years.
With his personal fortune at stake, Soros resolved to reengage, this time infusing his philosophical insights into his strategy—a thread to be explored soon. From 1982 to 1990, he collaborated with Victor Niederhoffer, a hedge fund manager known for his bold market plays. From 1988 to 2000, Stanley Freeman Druckenmiller, a financier commanding $3.1 billion in assets, joined his ranks.
Druckenmiller, often hailed as one of America’s—or even the world’s—most generous philanthropists, funneled $705 million into various foundations. Yet the sheen of such benevolence, a hallmark of billionaire decorum, often conceals complex motives and shadowed outcomes, a subject that will demand closer scrutiny in due course.
In 1988, George Soros deftly maneuvered through the stock holdings of Société Générale, France’s banking titan, executing trades that yielded a modest $2.2 million profit. The transaction, unremarkable at the time, scarcely rippled the financial waters.
Yet years later, it resurfaced with a vengeance when a French court convicted Soros of insider trading, alleging he had exploited confidential information to guide his moves—hardly the speculative gamble it appeared. His appeal, lodged with the European Court of Human Rights, was rebuffed in 2011, the court upholding the French verdict.
This rare display of judicial resolve stood firm against the billionaire’s formidable shadow, underscoring a troubling truth: Soros, it seemed, harbored few qualms about leveraging privileged knowledge. The episode casts doubt on the pristine image he and his advocates project, prompting an inevitable question: was this merely the tip of a much larger iceberg?
Meanwhile, Stanley Druckenmiller’s tenure alongside Soros was no small feat. Operating in the orbit of a financial luminary was daunting, yet Soros soon lauded his protégé with unrestrained praise, eventually entrusting him with the fund’s helm.
Druckenmiller’s performance, Soros declared, was nothing short of “fantastic.” Publicly, Soros reveled in the spotlight, courting attention that Druckenmiller shunned. Yet the younger man chafed under Soros’s watchful gaze, feeling stifled to the point of paralysis.
A heated phone exchange laid bare his frustration, nearly sundering their partnership. Recognizing the need for change, Soros loosened his grip, granting Druckenmiller autonomy over the fund’s lion’s share. Industry observers often attribute the Quantum Fund’s triumphs to Druckenmiller’s acumen, suggesting Soros, enamored of his own mystique, never corrected the public’s misattribution.
Druckenmiller, for his part, credited Soros’s terse yet incisive counsel, which proved pivotal in doubling the fund’s gains. Nowhere was this synergy more evident than on “Black Wednesday,” September 16, 1992—a day that cemented Soros’s legend.
The target was the British pound, which Soros deemed grossly overvalued within the European Monetary System (EMS), a precursor to the euro. In a audacious speculative assault, among the most ferocious in decades, Soros orchestrated massive short sales.
Over months, he borrowed $10 billion to bet against the pound, while Druckenmiller bought Deutsche Marks and sold sterling. The Bank of England, desperate to prop up its currency, raised interest rates from 10 to 12 percent to combat inflation—a move that tightened the screws on British homeowners, whose mortgages grew more burdensome, exacerbating an already deepening recession.
Undeterred, the bank signaled a further rate hike. Soros and his cadre of speculators intensified their onslaught, unyielding in their resolve. In the end, Soros prevailed. The British Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the UK’s withdrawal from the EMS and a return to the original interest rate. The pound plummeted—falling 15 percent against the Deutsche Mark and 25 percent against the dollar in mere weeks. Soros’s gambit yielded a staggering $1 billion in profit, transforming 1992 into a banner year and elevating him to global infamy as “the man who broke the Bank of England.”
This triumph, however, was not without its shadows. The wreckage of Black Wednesday—unemployment, foreclosures, and economic turmoil—bore heavily on ordinary Britons, whose struggles stood in stark contrast to Soros’s windfall. His victory, a masterstroke of financial daring, underscored the ruthless calculus of speculation, where fortunes are forged at the expense of nations. In the annals of Soros’s career, Black Wednesday remains a defining chapter, a testament to his brilliance and a reminder of the human toll exacted by the games of the powerful.
The Calculus of Disequilibrium
What if the audacious wager on the British pound had spectacularly misfired? The $10 billion borrowed to fuel the bet would have demanded repayment, a burden falling squarely on Soros’s shoulders. Yet he dismissed the risk with the cool assurance of a seasoned gambler. The wager, he explained, was “asymmetrical”—a high-reward, low-risk proposition.
Had the pound remained tethered to the European Monetary System, Soros would have faced only the borrowing costs plus a potential 2 percent appreciation, a mere $200 million on a $10 billion stake—hardly a dent in his calculus. Two years later, in 1994, a misstep in betting on the yen-dollar exchange rate cost him $600 million in a single day. Soros shrugged it off as “fluctuations,” a familiar ebb in the market’s tide, noting that his firm had closed every year in profit save one. “Speculators don’t always win,” he conceded, a nod to the precarious tightrope he walked.
This perspective owes much to the philosophy of Karl Popper, whose doctrine of fallibilism profoundly shaped Soros. Popper held that absolute truth and complete knowledge are unattainable, condemning humanity to the possibility of error. Certainty is a mirage; the only constant is change, and the only certainty is fallibility.
One may grasp truth but never fully know it, rendering the specter of mistake ever-present. For Soros, this insight fostered a relentless self-scrutiny, a willingness to revise judgments with a fluidity that set him apart. He attributes his fascination with survival to his youth amid the crucible of World War II, where testing boundaries without courting annihilation became a guiding principle. “I like to probe the limits,” he has said, “without risking my life.”
Soros found particular allure in states of disequilibrium, where conventional rules falter—a concept he tied to the political upheavals of his early years. Unlike the immutable laws of natural science, which economists often mistakenly apply to markets, Soros discerned patterns that permitted prediction.
His theory of reflexivity, refined during Eastern Europe’s revolutionary upheavals in the late 1980s, posits that near-equilibrium conditions align human perception with reality. But in times of extreme disruption—political turmoil or economic upheaval—perception and reality diverge sharply, creating chaos where unique dynamics prevail.
He distinguished two types of disequilibrium: the rigid imbalance of totalitarian regimes, which impose ideological facades at odds with truth, and the dynamic imbalance of rapid change, where human understanding lags behind events, as seen in the Soviet Union’s collapse. On financial markets, these ruptures manifest as boom-bust cycles, triggered under specific conditions. “When they occur,” Soros observed, “the world ticks differently, following a distinct pattern.”
This realization sharpened his focus. Disequilibrium became his domain, a terrain he navigated with the eagerness of a hound scenting prey. “I’ve made fortunes in markets that were out of joint,” he confessed, recalling encounters with the dislocations of Nazism and Communism.
Soros emerged as a strategist of instability, thriving where others faltered. His candid admission—“my mouth waters” at the prospect of such chaos—carries an unsettling echo, evoking a figure who not only endures crises but profits from them, a lesson honed in his formative years.
Soros’s playbook extended beyond Black Wednesday. He is widely credited with precipitating the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, toppling emerging markets, scooping up assets at fire-sale prices, and reaping colossal gains. These speculative salvos left countless victims—economies destabilized, livelihoods obliterated—while global ripples underscored the peril of such power concentrated in a single hand. The pound wager, devilishly brilliant, stands as a stark emblem of one man’s capacity to reshape nations.
When pressed on whether guilt gnaws at him, Soros remains unruffled. “Why should it?” he retorts. He insists he has adhered to the law—a claim somewhat tarnished by his insider trading conviction. His defense is as consistent as it is provocative: his successes merely expose flaws in the system, weaknesses that speculators exploit as a matter of course. “If you see an opportunity, you take it,” he argues, framing his actions as a diagnostic of systemic frailties, akin to a rigorous audit that paves the way for reform. This, he contends, drives progress—an evolutionary struggle where the fittest prevail, a nod to Social Darwinism.
Consideration for the vulnerable, so often the collateral damage of these transactions, finds little place in his rhetoric. The weak are exposed, he suggests, but the innocent who suffer remain a footnote.
Soros casts speculation as a crucible for improvement, a relentless test that strengthens the system for all. Yet this vision, rooted in survivalist logic, sidesteps the human toll. “Who better to critique the system,” he asks, “than those who thrive within it?”
His $23 billion fortune, as noted by Daniel Eckert in a 2013 Die Welt article, seems to affirm his logic, Popper notwithstanding. Eckert, no admirer, describes Soros as a “secretly revered ‘investor legend,’” whose global fame stems from “a series of daring speculations that fortuitously succeeded,” making him the planet’s 25th-richest individual. Unlike Warren Buffett, whose wealth derives from building enterprises, Soros’s fortune rests on “virtuosic financial acrobatics.”
Eckert’s skepticism, rare among mainstream voices that often lionize the “star investor” and “philanthropist,” hints at a deeper unease. To attribute Soros’s triumphs solely to luck, however, is to underestimate the calculated brilliance that has defined his ascent—a brilliance that, for better or worse, reshapes the world in its wake.
The Chasm Between Deed and Word
George Soros was no mere speculator; he was a master of calculated risk, navigating the labyrinth of markets with a precision that belied his professed indifference to mathematics. His grasp of financial mechanisms surpassed that of most, and he surrounded himself with a cadre of sharp minds. Success over decades, in a realm as unforgiving as high finance, cannot be chalked up to fortune alone.
Soros possessed every prerequisite for his meteoric rise: erudite yet cunning, fiercely intelligent and impeccably informed, he pursued his aims with unyielding resolve and a readiness to wager boldly. To some, he appeared cold, commanding, and manipulative—qualities tempered by neither charisma nor moral scruple. Opinions on his true character diverge sharply, but one facet of his ascent cannot be overlooked: the patronage of influential allies, whose role has already been noted.
Through a peculiar brand of system critique, Soros amassed immeasurable wealth, wielding power and influence on a scale few could rival. The “man of a thousand faces” claims to have devoted significant resources to reforming global financial markets, advocating for rules—such as banning perilous instruments like Credit Default Swaps, which he likened to “ticking time bombs”—that would curtail even his own profits.
He decries speculators’ “excessive” margins and points to rival hedge fund managers who funnel millions to lobbyists to dodge higher capital gains taxes, while positioning himself as a champion of such levies. This, he argues, would channel wealth back to society, ensuring that all benefit from the colossal gains of speculation.
A noble sentiment, yet its sincerity strains credulity in a man whose life has been an unrelenting quest for riches. Nor, he insists, do his vast philanthropic expenditures serve to salve a guilty conscience. On this, Soros likely speaks truth: remorse for the havoc his speculations wrought—displacing countless lives—seems foreign to him. He has even claimed, with a touch of wry humor, to be “cursed with an extremely poor memory,” unable to recall the intricacies of his legendary bet against the British pound.
A selective memory can be a convenient shield, particularly when summoned at will. Reflecting on the 1992 devaluation of the pound, Soros maintains it bore a silver lining: Britain’s exit from recession into growth. Yet he candidly admits that his motive was not systemic reform but raw profit—a goal he achieved in spades.
The dissonance between his actions and his rhetoric is striking. Soros has repeatedly called for the wealthy to bear a heavier tax burden, a stance that suggests a commitment to equitable justice. In a CNN interview, when asked if he supported President Obama’s proposal to raise taxes on the rich, he replied unequivocally: “Yes, very much… The super-bubble led to a sharp rise in inequality, and now we face sluggish growth. Better income distribution would leave the average American better off.”
This principled facade crumbled in April 2015, when a Bloomberg report exposed an inconvenient truth: Soros, the self-professed advocate of fair taxation, had deferred his own tax obligations for years. Exploiting a loophole in U.S. tax law, he reinvested client fees into his fund, amassing a deferred sum of $13.3 billion—a figure so astronomical it might belong in the realm of cosmology, as if each dollar marked a year in the universe’s age.
Though the loophole was closed in 2008, Soros faced a potential tax bill of $6.7 billion. When Bloomberg sought comment, he was conspicuously silent. Yet in 2011, he had publicly endorsed higher taxes on the wealthy, declaring, “I, too, should pay more!” Such pronouncements, in light of his tax deferrals, ring hollow, inviting accusations of hypocrisy—or, at best, a sly literalism. Perhaps Soros meant precisely what he said: he should pay more, even if he didn’t.
This is but one thread in a tapestry of contradictions. Soros demonizes fossil fuels yet invests in coal; professes admiration for Germany while he was betting against the Deutsche Mark and urging the nation to shoulder disproportionate burdens for Europe; and rails against George W. Bush while aligning with broader U.S. policy currents.
Each paradox, whether readily unraveled or stubbornly opaque, points to a central question: what serves Soros’s interests most? This lens is essential to understanding the sprawling network of organizations he commands and their true purposes, which often lie veiled beneath the sheen of altruism.
Soros’s life embodies a profound tension between essence and appearance, between the principles he espouses and the actions he pursues. His defenders see a visionary reformer; his critics, a consummate manipulator. Yet all agree on one truth: his billions, and the influence they wield, have reshaped the world in ways both profound and contentious, leaving a legacy as complex as the man himself.
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"Questionable ethics"? Great research but Soros is as evil as they come...
During the last four years the borders were wide open. The invaders were flown in and were exempt from the killshot and granted every consideration while during that time government hired, trained, and armed 87,000 IRS agents to sick on the American people who are paying for the room, board, travel costs to and into the interior, general welfare, and comfort of their third world replacements.
Soros, with the UN, is behind the invasion of all western nations. Here is the Hungarian Prime Minister exposing this plot - how Soros is destroying Europe - from a 2015 'Project Syndicate' manifesto by Soros: https://tritorch.com/clowardpiven [2:37mins]
What we have here is the execution of the Cloward-Piven strategy where criminal invaders flood our borders, swamping the US, meanwhile Soros buys up DAs all across the country who refuse to prosecute most crimes, and who are emptying the prisons. All of this is a deliberate recipe for cataclysm. Once the invaders fall off the welfare wagon and can no longer occupy hotels, they will be coming for our resources. It may be wise to get your spiritual house in order, and stock up on provisions. More on this here: https://tritorch.com/soros
We are surrounded by people who hate us, have nothing in common with our values and beliefs, and who will consider us righteous targets the minute the gravy stops flowing. Bush and Obama bombed many of their countries into oblivion and many that now walk among us are orphans from that malicious hellfire. They are hardened, furious, hateful, and will have no compunction to murder any of us as revenge for the US government savagely obliterating their families from bombs and invisible drones.
This is the reality.
The solution is to get local, get self-dependent, get the common unity back in community by building webs of resilience with your neighbors, get control of your school boards and town councils, get to know your sheriff, get a garden in your lawn no matter how small, a single tomato plant is better than nothing, get a well (water is your most important resource hands down), get ready, get organized, get moving, get doing, and get God.
Great piece. Loved it. Soros is in my observation a sociopath. An opportunist at every turn he is reputed to have turned in other Jewish people to the Nazi regime during WWII to save himself.