How to Remember Pearl Harbor

It's important to honor the memory of the dead, but it's equally important to remember those responsible for their deaths.

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The Bank of Japan, also known as Nippon Ginkō, was established on October 10, 1882. Initially, the Japanese Imperial Household was its main shareholder, and the bank operated as a conventional central bank, prioritizing the interests of private banks over public welfare. In 1929, C.H. Douglas, known for his “social credit system,” toured Japan to lecture on his financial ideas. Douglas advocated for the government's creation of national money and credit without interest, a concept that was warmly received by Japanese government and industry leaders. His works were widely translated and sold in Japan, surpassing sales in other countries.¹ Beginning in 1932, efforts were made to transform the Bank of Japan into a state-controlled institution focusing solely on national interests. This transformation was finalized in 1942 with the Bank of Japan Law, which was influenced by Germany's Reichsbank Act from January 1939.² The bank operated under this new framework subsequently.

“It declared that the Bank was a special corporation of a strongly national nature. The Bank was ‘to assume the task of controlling currency and finance and supporting and promoting the credit system in conformity with policies of the state to ensure the full use of the nation’s potential.’ Further, it was ‘to be managed with the accomplishment of national aims as its sole guiding principle’ (Article 2). As for the functions of the Bank, the law abolished the old principle of priority for commercial finance, empowering it to supervise facilities for industrial finance. The law also authorised the Bank to make unlimited advances to the government without security, and to subscribe for and to absorb government bonds. In respect of note-issues the law made permanent the system of the maximum issues limit; thus, the Bank could make unlimited issues to meet the requirements of munitions industries and of the government. On the other hand, government supervision of the Bank was markedly strengthened. The government could nominate, superintend and give orders to the president and the directors; there was also a clause giving the government more comprehensive powers to give so-called ‘functional orders’ to the bank, to direct it to perform any function it deemed necessary for the attainment of the Bank’s purpose. Moreover, the law made a wide range of the Bank’s business subject to governmental approval, including such matters as the alteration of bank rate, note-issues and accounts.”³

Japan, like many other countries, was grappling with the severe challenges brought on by the engineered Great Depression, which was largely perceived as a result of artificial economic factors. The shift from a central banking system to a state-controlled banking approach yielded quick and enduring positive outcomes for the nation.

Between 1931 and 1941, there was a substantial growth in various economic sectors: manufacturing output and industrial production rose by 140% and 136% respectively, while national income and Gross National Product increased by 241% and 259%, respectively. These growth rates were significantly higher compared to other industrialized nations during the same period. In terms of employment, the unemployment rate dropped from 5.5% in 1930 to 3.0% in 1938, indicating a healthier job market. Additionally, there was a notable reduction in industrial disputes, with the number of work stoppages falling from 998 in 1931 to just 159 in 1941.

The decline in industrial disputes in Japan was marked, with the number of stoppages dropping from 998 in 1931 to just 159 in 1941. By the late 1930s, Japan had risen to become the foremost economic power in East Asia, progressively eclipsing the exports of both America and England. In August 1940, Japan declared the formation of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere,⁴ signaling its growing influence in the region. This development, coupled with concerns that other nations might adopt Japan’s state banking methods, was perceived as a significant threat to the interests of the US Federal Reserve Bank. It was believed that these shifts in economic strategies and balances of power were so impactful that they could only be countered through military means.

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Relations between Japan and the United States deteriorated sharply starting in July 1939 when the U.S. terminated the 1911 Treaty of Commerce, consequently restricting Japan's access to crucial raw materials. This move was ostensibly in response to Japan's involvement in the war in China. The situation escalated in June 1940 with the U.S. imposing an embargo on aviation fuel, followed by a ban on exporting iron and steel to Japan in November of the same year. On July 25, 1941, the assets of Japan in England, the Netherlands, and America were frozen following Japan's occupation of Indochina (with the consent of Vichy France) to cut off China's southern supply lines. Subsequently, all trade between Japan and the United States was abruptly halted. Simultaneously, President Franklin D. Roosevelt prohibited all Japanese shipping from using the Panama Canal and enforced embargoes on rubber and oil. The oil embargo was particularly crippling, resulting in Japan losing 88% of its oil supplies, an essential resource for the country's survival.

General Hideki Tojo, who served as Prime Minister from October 1941 to July 1944, detailed in his diary how the United States consistently obstructed Japanese efforts to maintain peace. Japan's peaceful trade relations were continuously undermined by the United States, presenting a significant threat to Japan's future survival. The economic blockade was tightening like a noose around Japan's neck. Not only were the United States, England, China, and Holland using economic pressures to encircle Japan, but they were also redeploying and reinforcing naval forces across the region, including in the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaya. American battleships were observed patrolling the waters surrounding Japan. An American admiral even asserted that the Japanese fleet could be defeated in a matter of weeks, while British Prime Minister Churchill declared that England would align with the United States within 24 hours.

General Tojo recorded, “Japan made every effort to navigate these perilous circumstances through diplomatic negotiations. Despite Japan offering numerous concessions in the hope of finding a mutually acceptable solution, there was no progress because the United States remained steadfast in its original stance. Ultimately, the United States presented demands that Japan could not accept under the prevailing circumstances: a complete withdrawal of troops from China, disavowal of the Nanking government, and withdrawal from the Tripartite Pact.”⁵

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It had been preordained that the United States would eventually join the ranks of World War II, driven by the enticing prospect of substantial profits for the elite military-industrial corporations in an endeavor of such magnitude. Nevertheless, a formidable impediment loomed on the path to U.S. involvement in the conflict, epitomized by President Roosevelt's reluctance to commit American forces. He had secured re-election under the banner of a 'no European war' platform, and, at that juncture, a resounding majority of the American populace held reservations about embarking on yet another European war, one they rightly regarded as beyond their immediate concerns.

It is now also known that Roosevelt, under pressure from Elite industrial and financial interests and Churchill, desperate for the US to enter the war to aid a floundering British war effort, conspired together and with others to set in motion events to create a situation which would turn public opinion and generate the outcry that would make war inevitable.

Despite the fact that FDR had won a second term as President largely due to his oft-repeated promise that American soldiers would not become embroiled in the ‘European war’, he knew only too well that that is exactly what had been planned.

“The President assures us that our young men will not be deployed overseas,” declared Mr. Chairman. “However, that notion, sir, is quite erroneous. At this very moment, the berths for our soldiers are being constructed within the hulls of our transport vessels. Simultaneously, the tags for identifying the fallen and wounded are being meticulously printed by the esteemed firm of William C. Ballantyne & Co. right here in Washington.”

In 1939, Senator Nye of North Dakota took to the Senate floor to recite passages from a tome titled 'The Next War,' published in London several years prior. Within its pages lay a meticulous blueprint, outlining the elaborate strategy to entangle America in World War II by any conceivable means available. It emphatically stated:

“To persuade the US to take our part will be much more difficult, so difficult as to be unlikely to succeed. It will need a definite threat to America, a threat moreover, which will have to be brought home by propaganda, to every citizen, before the Republic will again take arms in an external quarrel... The position will naturally be considerably eased if Japan was involved and this might and probably would bring America in without further ado. At any rate, it would be a natural and obvious effect of our propagandists to achieve this, just as in the Great War they succeeded in embroiling the United States against Germany.”

During World War II, it has become evident beyond doubt that intercepted messages from Japan and warnings from other nations about Japan's intentions to attack Pearl Harbor were intentionally ignored to provide a pretext for entering the war. "We are faced with the sensitive task of engaging in diplomatic maneuvers to ensure that Japan appears to be the aggressor and initiates the first overt action," remarked Henry Stimson, the US Secretary of War in 1941.

In 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered the relocation of the fleet from the West Coast of the US mainland to its vulnerable position in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. He insisted that the fleet remain stationed there, despite protests from its commander, Admiral Richardson, who expressed concerns about the inadequate protection against air and torpedo attacks. Richardson was so adamant about this issue that he defied orders twice to berth his fleet in Pearl Harbor. In October, he personally raised the matter with FDR and, not surprisingly, was soon replaced. His successor, Admiral Kimmel, also raised similar unheard concerns.

Then, on June 23, 1941, Harold Ickes, an advisor to FDR, sent a memorandum to the President one day after Germany invaded the Soviet Union. In the memo, Ickes suggested that the embargo on oil to Japan could potentially create a situation that would not only make it possible but also straightforward for the United States to enter the war in a significant manner. He pointed out that if the U.S. were indirectly drawn into the conflict in this way, it would avoid the criticism of being seen as an ally of communist Russia.

FDR also found encouragement in Admiral Richmond Turner's report dated July 22, 1941. The report stated, “There is a prevailing belief that cutting off the American petroleum supply would quickly lead to Japan's invasion of the Netherland East Indies... it appears highly likely that Japan would also initiate military actions against the Philippine Islands, thereby immediately involving us in a Pacific war.”

On the 24th July, FDR told the Volunteer Participation Committee, “If we had cut off the oil, they probably would have gone down to the Dutch East Indies a year ago, and you would have had war.” The very next day FDR froze all Japanese assets in the US cutting off their main supply of oil and forcing them into some kind of desperate action against the US. Intelligence information regarding the Japanese threat was deliberately withheld from the military command in Hawaii from this point forward. After the Atlantic Conference on 14th August, Churchill noted the “… astonishing depth of Roosevelt's intense desire for war.” Churchill cabled his cabinet “FDR obviously was very determined that they should come in.”

“The December 7th the attack on Pearl Harbor was... far from the shock it proved to the country in general. We had expected something of the sort for a long time.” Eleanor Roosevelt, NY Times Magazine, October 8th, 1944.

Yes, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, but we the US pulled off an international sting operation to trick them into doing it. Roosevelt actually moved the shipping lanes so that the Japanese fleet would not be discovered and reported by some uninvolved ship's captain. Our own early attempts at radar picked up the incoming Zeros but that was explained as just a flock of birds, which given the unknown capabilities of radar at the time was believable. The fact remains that Roosevelt knew that Pearl Harbor was to be attacked because we had broken the Japanese code. Pearl Harbor was not warned because we wanted to get rid of the WWI ships and be forced to buy new ones and because that war, like all the others was never about nation- states, it was always about the money that every nation needed just to fight in these contrived wars. It has ALWAYS been about the money. And those who died in the attack on Pearl Harbor were just the price of doing business.

Through this intricate web of deception and subterfuge, the United States entered the war as had been orchestrated from the beginning. This tragic turn of events, among other horrors, led to the loss of over a quarter of a million American servicemen and inflicted devastating injuries upon hundreds of thousands more.

Following the surrender of Japan in World War II, one of the initial measures undertaken by the American occupation forces in September 1945 was the overhaul of Japan's banking system. This restructuring aimed to align it with international banking standards, particularly in terms of usury. This included ending the Bank of Japan's direct funding of the state and breaking up the large industrial conglomerates known as Zaibatsu. Joseph Dodge, a banker from Detroit, played a pivotal role in this financial reorganization, serving as an advisor to General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Allied Commander. While the Ministry of Finance managed to maintain some control over the banking sector and monetary policy, Japan faced challenges with these reforms.

In 1988, Japan was impacted by its adherence to Basel I regulations, which mandated an increase in the minimum capital requirements for risk-related assets of the Bank of Japan from 2% to 8%. This significant change triggered a prolonged period of economic stagnation and recession that lasted nearly three decades.

By April 1998, the Japanese Ministry of Finance was legally compelled to cede authority to the now-independent Bank of Japan. Since this transition, the Bank of Japan has operated as a central bank typical of those influenced by globalist agendas, often criticized for not prioritizing the best interests of the Japanese populace. The effects of these banking and financial policies on modern day Japan are widely known and have been discussed on several other occasions.

Further reading.

1. ‘New Economics’, 19 January 1934, 8 as quoted in D.J. Amos, The Story of the Commonwealth Bank, Veritas Publishing Company, Bullsbrook, Western Australia, 1986, 44.

2. S.M. Goodson, The Real Reason the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor, The Barnes Review, Washington D.C., Vol. XIV, No. 6, November/December 2008, 41-45.

3. Money and Banking in Japan, the Bank of Japan Economic Research Department, translated by S. Nishimura, edited by L.S. Pressnell, Macmillan, London, 1973, 38.

4. First conceived by General Hachiro Arita, who served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1936 to 1940. It was formally announced by Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke on 1 August 1940.

5. The Journal for Historical Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring 1992, Hideki Tojo’s Prison Diary, 41-42. The Tripartite Pact signed on 27 September 1940 was a ten year agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan. Its primary purpose was to maintain their new economic order based on usury free banking and to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of their respective peoples. Article 3 provided for mutual political, economic and military assistance, if one of the three powers was attacked by a power not then involved in the European war or Japanese-Chinese conflict.